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Non Technical Summary
Do higher corporate taxes reduce wages? While this question has been discussed extensively in 
economics, compelling empirical evidence is still scarce. In this discussion paper, we exploit the 
specific institutional setting of the German local business tax — the most important German profit 
tax — to provide new answers to this old question. Explicitly, we use annual changes in the local 
business tax rates set by 11,441 German municipalities to show that a one euro increase in a firm’s 
annual tax liabilities yields a decrease of the annual wage bill of 50 to 75 cents. This means that 
raising one euro of corporate tax revenue reduces local wages by up to three quarters of the revenue 
raised. We only find a negative effect on wages if firms are under a collective bargaining agreement. 
If workers are not represented by a trade union, the local business tax has no effect on the wage. The 
reason for this finding: workers which are represented by a trade union receive higher wages and have 
more to lose if corporate taxes increase. Consequently, high and medium-skilled workers experience 
relatively higher wage losses than low-skilled workers if corporate tax rates increase.
In the public and political debates, arguments in favor of (higher) corporate taxes are often based 
on redistributive motives: allegedly rich firm owners are supposed to contribute to financing public 
goods and social safety nets by paying their fair share of taxes. Opponents of high corporate taxes 
often claim that eventually the tax burden is (fully) shifted to labor, being immobile in an international 
context. Our findings shed new light on this debate and show that the shifting of the corporate tax 
burden is more complex. First, if workers receive relatively high wages — e.g. through collective bar-
gaining agreements –, they are likely to suffer from higher corporate taxes through wage decreases. 
If wages are low, employees do not have much to lose. Second, the analysis suggests that local 
corporate taxation might offer a possibility to prevent firm owners from shifting large(r) shares of 
the tax burden to workers. If labor is regionally mobile, competitive wages are determined within the 
regional or even the national labor market and should hardly respond to the tax changes in a small 
jurisdiction.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Führen höhere Unternehmenssteuern zu niedrigen Löhnen? Seit den frühen 1960er Jahren beschäf-
tigen sich Wirtschaftswissenschaftler mit dieser Frage. Trotzdem gibt es bis heute nur wenige über-
zeugende empirische Antworten. In diesem Diskussionspapier nutzen wir Änderungen in Hebesätzen 
der deutschen Gewerbesteuer, um eine neue Antwort auf diese alte Frage zu geben. Jedes Jahr ändern 
8% der deutschen Gemeinden den Gewerbesteuer-Hebesatz. Wir finden, dass Unternehmen für jeden 
zusätzlichen Euro an Steuerlast die Lohnsumme um 50-75 Cents senken. Das bedeutet, dass Un-
ternehmen drei Viertel der Gewerbesteuerlast auf Arbeitnehmer überwälzen. Allerdings finden wir 
diesen Überwälzungseffekt nur in Firmen mit Tarifverträgen. Arbeitnehmern in Unternehmen ohne 
Tarifverträge müssen keine Lohneinbußen nach Gewerbesteuererhöhungen hinnehmen. Der Grund 
für diese unterschiedlichen Effekte: Tariflöhne sind im Schnitt höher als frei verhandelte Löhne in 
vergleichbaren Jobs. Daher haben Arbeitnehmer unter Tarifverträgen mehr zu verlieren, wenn Unter-
nehmenssteuern steigen. Folglich finden wir auch einen stärkeren Lohnrückgang für besser qualifi-
zierte Arbeitnehmer. 
Argumente für höhere Unternehmensteuern haben oftmals einen verteilungspolitischen Hintergrund: 
vermeintliche wohlhabendere Unternehmer sollen stärker zur Finanzierung von öffentlichen Gütern 
und Staatsausgaben herangezogen werden. Gegner von höherer Unternehmensbesteuerung berufen 
sich oft auf die oben diskutierten Überwälzungsmöglichkeiten von Firmen - insbesondere in Bezug 
auf Arbeitnehmer. Die Ergebnisse unserer Studie bringen zwei Argument in die Debatte ein: Erstens, 
haben Arbeitnehmer mit relativ hohen Löhnen eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit einen Teil der Unter-
nehmenssteuerlast zu tragen. Arbeitnehmer mit niedrigen Löhnen haben vergleichsweise wenig zu 
verlieren. Das heißt, der Lohneffekt der Steuererhöhung hängt stark von Situation vor der Steuerer-
höhung ab. Zweitens, zeigt unsere Analyse, dass lokale Unternehmensbesteuerung eine Möglichkeit 
darstellt, die Überwälzung der Steuerlast zu verringern. Wenn Arbeitnehmer regional mobil sind, 
werden Marktlöhne im regionalen oder sogar im nationalen Arbeitsmarkt bestimmt. In diesem Fall 
führen höhere lokale Steuern nicht zu niedrigeren Löhnen.
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Abstract
Because of endogeneity problems very few studies have been able to iden-
tify the incidence of corporate taxes on wages. We circumvent these prob-
lems by using an 11-year panel of data on 11,441 German municipalities’ tax
rates, 8 percent of which change each year, linked to administrative matched
employer-employee data. Consistent with our theoretical model, we find a
negative effect of corporate taxation on wages: a 1 euro increase in tax liabil-
ities yields a 77 cent decrease in the wage bill. The direct wage effect, arising
in a collective bargaining context, dominates, while the conventional indirect
wage effect through reduced investment is empirically small due to regional la-
bor mobility. High and medium-skilled workers, who arguably extract higher
rents in collective agreements, bear a larger share of the corporate tax burden.
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1 Introduction
The debate about who bears the burden of corporate taxation has recently shifted
from the theoretical to the empirical arena. A large number of theoretical contri-
butions inspired by Harberger (1962)’s seminal paper suggest that labor bears a
substantial share of the corporate tax burden.1 However, there are only few em-
pirical studies on the wage incidence of corporate taxation. The main reason for
this lack of empirical evidence is that measuring the effect of corporate taxation on
wages raises a number of difficult conceptual and econometric issues. First, con-
ceptually, it is important to distinguish between different channels through which
corporate taxes can affect wages. For instance, most theoretical studies emphasize
that corporate taxes reduce wages because they reduce investment. But taxes may
also affect the wage setting process, depending on the way in which wages are de-
termined. Then there may be general equilibrium effects of tax changes on wages
and prices. Second, there needs to be sufficient exogenous variation in corporate tax
rates. Third, the analysis must control appropriately for the economic environment
in which the tax changes occur. Clearly, the latter two conditions are necessary to
establish a quasi-experimental setting which is crucial for identification.
It is difficult to find a research design dealing with all of these issues in a
satisfactory manner. One avenue is to use cross-country data (Hassett and Mahur,
2006; Felix, 2007; Desai et al., 2007), which is helpful to capture general equilibrium
effects. Yet, cross-country studies on the wage incidence of corporate taxes usually
exploit differentials in country-specific tax rates over time and therefore often have
troubles to defend the common trend assumption: in general, it is not likely that
differences in the wage growth paths of e.g. Germany and the U.S. can be purely
attributed to changes in national corporate tax policies.
An alternative to using cross-country data is to look at a single country and to
exploit regional and/or industry-specific variation in corporate taxes to identify the
wage incidence (Dwenger et al., 2011; Liu and Altshuler, 2013). Here, the common
trend assumption is arguably more credible, while the variation in tax rates is often
not as clear as in the first group of studies. The influential paper by Arulampalam
et al. (2012) acknowledges this problem by exploiting both cross-firm and cross-
1 The literature following Harberger (1962) extended the model to the open economy case
(Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971; Bradford, 1978; Kotlikoff and Summers, 1987; Harberger, 1995),
incorporated more sectors (Shoven, 1976) and introduced uncertainty (Ratti and Shome, 1977).
Surveys are provided by Auerbach (2005) and Harberger (2006). Recent computational general
equilibrium (CGE) models find that labor bears a substantial share of the corporate tax burden
under reasonable assumptions (see Gravelle, 2013, for an overview).
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country variation in tax burdens. Nevertheless, as the authors admit, studies using
cross-country firm data are normally not able to capture the general equilibrium
effects of national corporate taxes. Therefore the authors focus on what they call
the direct wage effect, which arises in a collective bargaining setting. The analysis
leaves aside the indirect wage effect through investment as well as other general
equilibrium effects on prices and other relevant variables.
In this paper, we exploit the specific institutional setting of the German local
business tax – the most important profit tax in terms of revenue – to achieve a clean
identification of the full corporate tax incidence on wages.2 From 1998 to 2008, on
average 8% of the 11,441 German municipalities adjusted their local business tax
rates per year. These municipalities face the same overall economic conditions and
are therefore comparable so that the necessary common trend assumption is likely to
hold.3 Moreover, local corporate tax autonomy allows us to treat municipalities as
many small open economies within the highly integrated German national economy
– with close to perfect mobility of capital and labor across (municipal) borders. We
are thus confident to measure the full incidence of corporate tax changes, not just
the direct effect. The reason is that general equilibrium effects on interest rates and
other variables that might affect wages will be negligible in this setting.
We set up a theoretical model that allows us to study the incidence of a local
corporate tax in an economy with different types of labor (skilled and unskilled)
and where wages in some firms are determined through collective bargaining. In
the model the full incidence of corporate taxation can be decomposed into a direct
effect related to rent division in collective bargaining and an indirect effect through
the adjustment of investment and employment. We then test the theoretical model
combining administrative panel data on the universe of the German municipalities
with rich administrative linked employer-employee microdata taken from German
social security records.
Our empirical findings are as follows: First, in line with the theoretical model,
we find parametric and non-parametric evidence for a sizeable direct wage effect of
corporate taxation in firms with collective bargaining. We estimate a wage elasticity
with respect to the effective corporate tax rate of −0.35. In money terms this implies
that a one euro increase in annual tax liabilities yields a 50 cent decrease of the
annual wage bill, which is in line with findings of other recent studies (Arulampalam
2 See, e.g., Bu¨ttner (2003); Janeba and Osterloh (2012) for studies analyzing this specific tax.
3 A similar set-up is used by Felix and Hines Jr. (2009) who exploit the variation in corporate
tax rates among U.S. states. Yet, their results are based on a single cross-section, which makes it
impossible to control for potential state fixed effects.
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et al., 2012; Liu and Altshuler, 2013). The incidence increases to 67 cents when
including one lag of the corporate tax rate. Second, we find only a small indirect
effect on wages. This is consistent with labor being mobile across municipal borders.4
In sum, we estimate a full incidence, consisting of the direct and indirect effect, of
77 cents, which means that raising one euro of corporate tax revenue reduces local
wages in unionized firms by about three quarters of the revenue raised.
The negative direct wage effect is larger if collective bargaining takes place at
the firm level rather than at the sectoral level, which is in line with the theoretical
model. High and medium-skilled workers experience relatively higher wage losses
than low-skilled workers if corporate tax rates increase. One explanation would
be that medium and high-skilled workers have more bargaining power and thus
capture a higher share of the rent generated by the firm so that they also lose more
if taxes diminish this rent. We run several tests to show that our estimates are
well-identified. Reassuringly, including job or labor market region time trends does
not render our estimates, which makes it unlikely that our estimates are biased by
unobserved, time-variant confounders. Moreover, a placebo test on non-liable firms
shows a zero effect of the local business tax on wages.
Our study adds to the existing literature in four dimensions. First and most
importantly, this is the first study on the wage incidence of corporate taxes using
linked employer-employee data. In addition to administrative wage data, exploiting
firm information is crucial to (i) take into account that only certain types of firms pay
the local business tax while other types of firms are exempt by law, (ii) identify the
wage setting and collective bargaining status of the firm, (iii) differentiate between
corporate and non-corporate firms. Moreover, we are able to estimate heterogeneous
worker and firm effects. Second, this study is the first to exploit compelling variation
in tax rates induced by numerous local tax reforms in order to cleanly identify the
tax incidence on wages, while keeping the overall economic environment constant.5
Third, the particular institutional setting of the German business tax allows us to
4 Intra-regional employment effects of the German local business tax are analyzed in a com-
panion paper (Siegloch, 2013).
5 The only other study with a similar set-up is Bauer et al. (2012), which was conducted
simultaneously and independently of our study (cf. the earliest version of this study Fuest et al.,
2011). The author are also investigating the German local business tax. A closer look at Bauer
et al. (2012) shows, however, that they do not have information on the municipality (Gemeinde) in
their data. Hence, they estimate their model using average tax rates on the more aggregate county
(Kreis) level (there are roughly 11,400 municipalities vs. 400 counties). This makes the variation
imprecise since annual tax changes occurring in only 8% of the municipalities lead to variation of
average tax rates in 65-75% of the counties. Thus, firms (and wages) in unaffected municipalities
are wrongly exposed to the county’s average changes. Moreover, the authors are lacking relevant
firm information since they are not using linked employer-employee data.
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estimate the full wage incidence taking into account both the direct and the indirect
effect of corporate tax changes. Finally, in our theoretical analysis, we extend the
model of Arulampalam et al. (2012) by allowing for different skill levels and by
distinguishing between firm and sector level bargaining.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
German corporate tax legislation with a focus on the German local business tax and
give a short overview of wage bargaining arrangements in Germany. In Section 3
we set up a theoretical wage bargaining model that features the particular German
setting to demonstrate how municipal corporate taxes affect the wages of hetero-
geneous workers. Section 4 presents the datasets. Empirical results are shown and
discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional background
2.1 Corporate taxation in Germany
Corporate firms (Kapitalgesellschaften) face two profit taxes in Germany, the local
business tax (LBT, Gewerbesteuer) set by municipalities and the corporate tax
(CT, Ko¨rperschaftstuer) levied by the federal government. The LBT is the most
important profit tax in Germany generating more than 50% of total business tax
revenue. In addition, it is the most important source of financing at disposal of
municipalities generating roughly three quarters of municipal tax revenue.
The LBT applies to both corporate and non-corporate firms (Personenge-
sellschaften)6, while most firms in the agricultural and public sector are not liable
to the LBT. Moreover, certain liberal professions such as journalists, physicians or
lawyers are exempt. The tax base, Y , is the same for both LBT and CT and essen-
tially consists of operating profits since 1998.7 For the LBT the tax base of firms
with multiple establishments is divided between municipalities according to formula
apportionment based on the wage bill of the individual establishments. Importantly,
until 2007 a firm could deduct the LBT (but not the CT) payments from the com-
mon tax base. The tax rate of the LBT, τLBT , consists of two components: the
basic federal rate (Steuermesszahl), τfed, which is set at the national level, and the
collection rate (Hebesatz ), cr, set at the local level. Thus τLBT = τfed · cr. τfed was
at 5.0% from 1998 to 2007 and decreased to 3.5% in 2008. The collection rate usu-
6 Taxation of non-corporate firms will be discussed in Section 5.6.
7 Depending on the year, only a certain share of interest payments is deductible.
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ally varied between 250% and 450% in the period from 1998 to 2008 (5th and 95th
percentiles).8 The collection rates for year t are passed by the municipal councils
during the budgeting for t, which usually take places in the last three months of
year t− 1. It is important to note that a municipality can only adjust the collection
rate which applies to all (liable) firms in the municipality; it can neither change the
tax base nor liability criteria, which are both set at the federal level.
The CT rate, τCT , has undergone several changes in recent years. Until 2000
an imputation system existed in Germany, where retained profits where subject to
a tax rate of 45% in 1998 and 40% in 1999 and 2000 – dividends were taxed at a
rate of 30% from 1998 to 2000. As of 2001 retained and distributed profits were
equally taxed at 25% (26.5% in 2003). In 2008 τCT was lowered to 15%. In all years,
a so-called solidary surcharge (to finance the costs of reunification), soli, of 5.5% of
the corporate tax rate is added.
In order to calculate the total effective statutory tax rate for corporate firms,
first, LBT and CT rates are added. Second, the deduction of the LBT liabilities
from the tax base has to be taken into account. The effective (statutory) marginal
tax rate9 for corporate firms, τ corpEMTR, from 1998 to 2007, is
τ corpEMTR =
τCT · (1 + soli) + τfed · cr
1 + τfed · cr .
Since 2008 the denominator is 1, as the LBT cannot be deducted from the tax base
anymore. Assuming a collection rate of 350%, the average EMTR decreased from
0.55 in 1998 to 0.28 in 2008 with an average value of 0.41 over the whole sample
period. For a collection rate of 250% (450%) the average τ corpEMTR is 0.38 (0.43).
2.2 Wage bargaining in Germany
As our theoretical and empirical analysis takes into account collective bargaining,
we briefly sketch the situation of labor unions in Germany. Traditionally, German
labor unions have been influential. Collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) at the
industry-level are the most important bargaining mechanism for wage determina-
tion. Nevertheless, there has been a significant decline in bargaining coverage. In
West (East) Germany, the total proportion of employees covered by CBA decreased
from 76% (63%) in 1998 to 65% (51%) in 2009; the share of workers covered by
8 In 2004 a legally required minimum collection rate of 200% was introduced which affected
very few municipalities and was mainly targeted at those with rates of (close to) zero
9 Note that this is an effective statutory marginal tax rate, as opposed to more conventional
measures of the effective marginal tax rate which include tax base parameters.
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sectoral agreements fell from 68% (52%) to 56% (38%) (Ellguth et al., 2012). Firms
may pay wages in excess of wages stipulated in CBAs (Gu¨nstigkeitsprinzip). If they
want to pay lower wages, in contrast, opening clauses negotiated between unions and
firms are required. Effectively, there is a number of cases where bargaining takes
place at the firm level. This applies in the case of wage payments in excess of CBAs,
opening clauses or company agreements (Firmentarifvertrag). Some employers are
not at all covered by a CBA and can completely rely on individual contracts with
each employee. Note that with a few exceptions there is no legal minimum wage
in Germany. However, the social security and welfare system provides an implicit
minimum wage and CBAs ensure that wages are above a certain level (Lohnab-
standsgebot). The average duration of a CBA increased from 12 months in 1991 to
22 months in 2011.10 Usually, negotiations take place in the first half of a year.
3 Theoretical framework
Consider an economy which consists of n jurisdictions. There are many firms in each
jurisdiction. Firms use the following factors of production: capital (K), which is
homogeneous, and workers with differing skill levels. There are 2 skill levels. Labor
of skill type k, k = 1, 2, is denoted by Lk. The production function F (K,L1, L2)
may differ across firms but is assumed to have the usual neoclassical properties
and exhibits declining returns to scale in capital and labor, i.e. there is an implicit
fourth factor, which can be thought of as a location specific rent. Capital and both
types of labor are mobile across municipal borders. This is a strong assumption
when it comes to labor mobility within a large country. However, within a labor
market region that may include a fairly large number of jurisdictions (in Germany
there are on average 44 municipalities per labor market region), it is plausible that
employees are mobile – at least at the margin. Firms are immobile, due to the
location specific rent. While this might seem a strong assumption, we observe only
few firms changing municipality in our data.
Firm profits are taxed by the individual jurisdictions and by the central gov-
ernment. The rate of the local profit tax in jurisdiction i is denoted by θi; the rate
of the profit tax levied by the central government is denoted by T . Both taxes
10 In the chemical industry, for instance, the CBA was renewed in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007,
2008, 2010, 2011, while in the steel industry new collective agreements were negotiated in 2002,
2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010. The firm-level CBA of Volkswagen was renewed in 2002, 2004,
2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011. See the WSI Collective Agreement Archive for more information
http://www.boeckler.de/wsi-tarifarchiv_39335.htm).
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have the same base, apart from the fact that the local tax is deductible from the
base of the profit tax levied by the central government. The after tax profit of the
representative firm located in jurisdiction i is given by
Pi = [Fi(Ki, L
1
i , L
2
i )−
2∑
k=1
wki L
k
i ](1− τi)− (1− ατi)rKi, (1)
where wki is the wage for labor of skill type k, τi = T + θi(1 − T ) is the effective
statutory tax rate on profits and r is the non-tax cost of capital.11 The variable α
is the share of the capital costs which can be deducted from the tax base. In line
with most existing tax systems, we assume 0 < α < 1, which implies that capital
costs are partly but not fully deductible (α = 0.5 in Germany).
Firms operate under conditions of perfect competition in output and input
markets, with the exception of the labor market. There is a dual labor market
with two types of firms. In the first type, workers are represented by trade unions
and wages are set via bargaining. In the second type, no unions exist and wage
setting is competitive. To simplify notation we normalize the number of firms per
type and jurisdiction to unity. In unionized firms wages are set according to a
standard efficient bargaining model, where unions and firms bargain over wages and
employment.12 Each skill type is represented by one trade union.13 Bargaining takes
place either at the firm level or at the sector level.
3.1 Firm level bargaining
We start by assuming that bargaining takes place at the firm level. Each firm nego-
tiates with all unions simultaneously (Barth and Zweimu¨ller, 1995). The objective
function of the union representing the workers of skill type k in firm i is given by
Zki = L
k
iw
k
i .
The reservation wage for workers in unionized firms is wk, the wage rate of skill
group k in the competitive labor market. Therefore the fall back utility of the union
11 If firms operate in more than one jurisdiction the local tax in Germany is determined through
formula apportionment. This has implications for the incidence of the tax. We analyze this case
theoretically in Appendix A. In our empirical analysis of incidence effects we find no significant
differences between multi and single-establishment firms.
12 It is straightforward to show that our key results regarding the incidence of the profit tax on
wages would be very similar if we used a model where unions and firms only bargain over wages
(see, e.g., Oswald, 1993).
13 Assuming that there is one union which represents all skill levels would lead to the same
qualitative results regarding the impact of corporate tax changes.
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is Z
k
i = L
k
iw
k. We assume that the reservation profit of the firm is equal to zero.14
After wages and employment levels are determined, firms set Ki to maximize
profits, which implies
∂Fi(Ki, L
1
i , L
2
i )
∂Ki
= Ri, (2)
where Ri denotes the cost of capital, which is given by
Ri = r
(1− ατi)
(1− τi) .
The outcome of the wage bargaining process is given by
wk∗i , L
k∗
i = arg max
wki ,L
k
i
Ωki ,
where
Ωki = β
k ln(Zki − Zki ) + (1− βk) lnPi.
The parameter βk ∈ (0, 1) stands for the relative bargaining power of skill type k
union. The first order conditions of the bargaining problem can be rearranged to
yield
wk∗i = w
k +
βk
(1− βk)
Pi
Lki (1− τi)
(3)
and
∂F (Ki, L
1
i , L
2
i )
∂Lki
= wk k = 1, 2. (4)
The equilibrium wage rate in unionized firms is equal to the skill specific reservation
wage plus a share of the firm’s profit per worker. The size of this share depends on
the bargaining power of the trade union. Employment is set so that the marginal
productivity of labor is equal to the reservation wage.
The focus of our analysis is how changes in local profit taxes affect wages. We
distinguish between two channels through which taxes affect wages. Following Aru-
lampalam et al. (2012), we refer to the first channel as the direct impact. Through
wage bargaining workers receive part of the profits generated by the firm. If higher
taxes reduce these profits, this will affect wages for given levels of capital and labor
inputs. The second channel, referred to as the indirect channel, is the change in
wages caused by the adjustment of other input factors or input prices as a reaction
to the change in tax. To define the two effects more precisely in our model, we can
14 An alternative assumption would be that the other skill groups work and receive their wages
and that output and investment would be lower than in the case of agreement. This would add
notation without changing the signs of the results derived below.
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solve equation (3) for the equilibrium wage rate of skill type k:
wk∗i =
1
(1− βkβj)Lki
[wki (1− βk)Lki − wji (1− βj)βkLji
+ (1− βj)βk (Fi(Ki, L1i , L2i )−RiKi)], k 6= j. (5)
Equation (5) is the focus of our interest. Note first that equations (2) and (4)
define the factor demand equations as functions of the skill specific reservation wages
and the cost of capital, Ki(Ri, w
1
i , w
2
i ), L
1
i (Ri, w
1
i , w
2
i ), L
2
i (Ri, w
1
i , w
2
i ). Given this,
equation (5) defines the wage rate of skill group k as a function of the cost of capi-
tal, the firm’s factor inputs and a number of other variables like relative bargaining
power, i.e. wk∗i = w
k∗
i (τi, Ki(Ri, w
1
i , w
2
i ), L
k
i (Ri, w
1
i , w
2
i ), L
j
i (Ri, w
1
i , w
2
i ), ...). Differen-
tiating (5) with respect to τi allows us to express the overall effect of a change in τi
on wk∗i as
∂wk∗i
∂τi
= −(1− β
j)βk
(1− βkβj)
Ki
Lki
∂Ri
∂τi
− (w
k∗
i − wk)
Lki
∂Lki
∂Ri
∂Ri
∂τi
− w
j
i (1− βj)βk
(1− βkβj)Lki
∂Lji
∂Ri
∂Ri
∂τi
, k 6= j (6)
This overall effect can be expressed as the sum of a direct and an indirect effect:
∂wk∗i
∂τi
= direct effect + indirect effect
where
direct effect ≡ −(1− β
j)βk
(1− βkβj)
Ki
Lki
∂Ri
∂τi
< 0; (7)
indirect effect ≡ −
(
(wk∗i − wk)
Lki
∂Lki
∂Ri
+
wji (1− βj)βk
(1− βkβj)Lki
∂Lji
∂Ri
)
∂Ri
∂τi
T 0, (8)
with
∂Ri
∂τi
= r
(1− α)
(1− τi)2 > 0.
The direct effect is unambiguously negative. The reason is that an increase in
the tax rate reduces the quasi rent generated by the firm. Since unions capture part
of this rent, workers lose if this rent becomes smaller. The magnitude of the direct
effect is increasing in the bargaining power of the skill group βk. This means that
skill groups with a lot of bargaining power are more likely to bear a larger burden
of profit taxes. Again the explanation is that these groups capture a higher share
of the rent in the first place.
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The sign of the indirect effect is in general ambiguous. Interestingly, the change
in investment caused by the tax change has no (immediate) effect on the wage. The
explanation is straightforward. It follows from equations (2) and (5) that, if the
firm is at its profit maximizing investment level,
∂wk∗i
∂Ki
= 0. A marginal change in
investment does not change the profit generated by the firm so that the equilibrium
wage, which is a share of this rent, does not change either. However, a change
in investment will affect employment. Likewise a marginal change in employment
does not change the overall rent either, but it does affect the rent per worker.
Therefore the sign of the indirect effect in this model only depends on how a change
in corporate taxes affects the number of workers in the skill group. How exactly
the number of high and low-skilled workers is affected depends on the properties of
the production function including the complementarity between high and low-skilled
labor and capital, as we show in Appendix A.15 For our empirical analysis one should
bear in mind that, according to the theory, the indirect effect is transmitted through
adjustment in employment, not investment.
These findings may be summarized as:
Result 1: Direct effect : For given factor input levels, an increase in the
corporate tax rate reduces the wage rate of all skill groups in unionized firms.
Result 2: Indirect effect : The indirect effect of a corporate tax change on
wages may be positive or negative.
3.2 Sector level bargaining
The effects of corporate tax changes on wages may not only differ across skill groups
but also across firms with different characteristics. One important difference between
firms is that wage bargaining institutions may differ. So far we have assumed that
bargaining takes place at the firm level. In many countries including Germany, wage
bargaining can also take place at the sectoral level. In this case, if firms in a sector
are located in many different municipalities, one would expect that the impact of
a change in the local corporate tax in one municipality has a small or possibly
negligible effect on the wage rate.
We model wage negotiations at the sector level as follows. Assume that m < n
unionized firms in the economy belong to one sector. Wages for each skill group are
15 For instance, if all factors of production are complements, i.e. ∂
2F
∂Lk∂K
, ∂
2F
∂Lk∂Lj
> 0, k =
1, 2, k 6= j, an increase in the corporate tax rate unambiguously reduces demand for both types of
labor. But if some factors are substitutes results may be different.
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identical in all firms, and the objective function of the union is given by
m∑
i=1
Zki =
m∑
i=1
Lkiw
k. It is not quite clear what bargaining over employment means at the sector
level. In the following we assume that employer associations and unions bargain over
employment in each individual firm. This means that the result of the bargaining
process is a uniform wage for all workers of skill level k in a sector and a vector
of employment levels Lk1, ..., L
k
m.
16 Firms pursue the objective to maximize the sum
of their profits
m∑
i=1
Pi. The derivation of equilibrium employment levels and wages
for the two skill groups is equivalent to the derivation described in the preceding
section. The equilibrium wage rate for skill group k is now given by
wks∗ =
Θ
(1− βkβj)
m∑
i=1
[Lki (1− τi)]
k 6= j, (9)
where
Θ = wk(1− βk)
m∑
i=1
[Lki (1− τi)]− wj(1− βj)βk
m∑
i=1
[Lji (1− τi)]
+ (1− βj)βk
(
m∑
i=1
[(Fi(Ki, L
1
i , L
2
i )(1− τi)− (1− ατi)rKi)]
)
(10)
It is straightforward to show that, as soon as at least two firms in a sector are
located in different jurisdictions, the direct effect of a tax change on union wages in
the jurisdiction where the tax change takes place is smaller in magnitude than in the
case of firm level bargaining. We give the formal proof in Appendix A. The result
is intuitive - wage bargaining will be influenced by taxes in all jurisdictions where
the sector has a presence so that a tax change in just one jurisdiction has a limited
impact. The indirect effect is not necessarily smaller because different firms may
have different production functions so that their input demand may react differently
to corporate tax changes. This can be summarized as
Result 3: The direct effect of a change in the local corporate tax rate on
wages in unionized firms is smaller under sector level bargaining, compared to firm
level bargaining.
Note that Results 1 and 2 still hold under sector level bargaining.
16 An earlier version of this paper used the seniority model of wage bargaining (Oswald, 1993),
where unions are dominated by workers who are interested in higher wages but not in the level of
employment. In this framework the issue of bargaining over employment at the sector level does
not arise. This model yields similar results in terms of the level of collective bargaining.
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3.3 Corporate tax incidence in the competitive sector
Consider finally the firms in the competitive sector. Since capital and both types of
labor are mobile across jurisdictional borders, competitive wages are determined in
the national labor market. Since each municipality is small, relative to the economy
as a whole, a change in the local tax rate will leave wages in the competitive sector
unchanged. The tax change will affect factor inputs but not factor prices (Siegloch,
2013). This may be stated as
Result 4: In firms without union bargaining, the direct and indirect effect of
a change in the local corporate tax rate on wages is equal to zero.
Clearly, this result is specific to local corporate tax incidence. Given that
labor mobility across national borders is typically low, the incidence of a nationwide
corporate tax would be different.
4 Data
For our analysis we combine two distinct data sources: administrative data on the
universe of German municipalities containing information on their fiscal and bud-
getary situation (Section 4.1), and detailed administrative linked employer-employee
data from social security records (Section 4.2).
4.1 Municipality data
As far as municipal data are concerned, we make use of statistics provided by the
Statistical Offices of the 16 German federal states (Statistische Landesa¨mter). The
states collect information on the fiscal and budgetary situation of all municipalities.
We combine and harmonize the annual state specific datasets and construct a panel
on the universe of all municipalities from 1998 to 2008 covering roughly 125,000
data points – i.e. municipality-years. Most importantly, the dataset contains infor-
mation on the local collection rate, but also on the population size and municipal
expenses and revenues. Moreover, we add data from the German federal employ-
ment agency on regional unemployment rates on the more aggregate county (Kreis)
level to control for local labor market conditions. As all these regional factors have
been found to affect LBT rates (Bu¨ttner, 2003), it is important to control for them
in the empirical analysis below.
Figure 1 depicts Germany’s 11,441 municipalities and visualizes the substantial
cross-sectional and time variation in collection rates. While the left panel of the
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figure shows the cross-sectional variation in local tax rates in 2008 with darker
colors showing higher tax rates, the right panel shows the number of tax changes a
municipality has experienced during the observation period 1998-2008 with darker
colors indicating more changes.
Figure 1: Cross-sectional and time variation in collection rates
We now take a closer look at the within-municipality time variation of the
collection rates, which is later used to identify the tax effect on wages. Table 1
shows that on average 8% of the municipalities (i.e. about 1,000 municipalities)
change their collection rate per year. Most municipalities increase collection rates
over time and most of the increases in collection rates occurred between 2000 and
2006. The average increase amounts to 21 points corresponding to 6% of the mean
collection rate. Next, Table 2 shows that the changes in collection rates are not
concentrated among a few communities but rather widespread. More than half of
the communities have changed their tax rates at least once during the observation
period. Furthermore, one third of the communities were affected at least by one
big tax change, defined as a change equal to or greater than the mean change of 21
points. The average big change was 31 points (8.9%).
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Table 1: Share of communities with changing collection rates (in %)
∆τ 6= 0 ∆τ > 0 ∆τ < 0
Total 8.1 7.2 0.9
1999 5.4 4.3 1.1
2000 8.4 7.4 1.0
2001 12.7 11.5 1.3
2002 8.6 7.9 0.7
2003 9.8 9.1 0.8
2004 8.8 8.2 0.6
2005 11.0 10.4 0.7
2006 7.8 7.0 0.8
2007 4.4 3.7 0.8
2008 4.0 3.2 0.8
Source: Statistical Offices of the La¨nder. Note: N=11,441 per year.
Table 2: Number of tax changes per community, 1998-2008
any change big change
# changes # municipalities in % # municipalities in %
0 4977 43.50 7575 66.21
1 4376 38.25 3376 29.51
2 1552 13.57 430 3.76
3 402 3.51 57 0.50
4 96 0.84 2 0.02
5 32 0.28 1 0.01
6 6 0.05 0 0.00
Source: Statistical Offices of the La¨nder. Note: The average increase is 21 points (6%). A big
change is defined as an increase of more than 21 points. The average big change is 31 points (8.9%).
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4.2 Worker and firm data
We combine the administrative municipal data with the linked employer-employee
dataset (LIAB) provided by the Institute of Employment Research (IAB) in Nurem-
berg, Germany (Alda et al., 2005). The employee data are a 2% sample of the
administrative employment statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency
(Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit), called the German employment register, which covers
all employees paying social security contributions or receiving unemployment bene-
fits (Bender et al., 2000). Note that civil servants and self-employed individuals are
not observed in the social security data. The employee information are recorded on
June 30th of each year and include information on wages, age, tenure, occupation,
employment type (full-time or part-time employment) and qualification. Individuals
with missing information are excluded. Our worker panel consists of between 1.6
and 2.0 million workers annually observed from 1998 to 2008.
Importantly, wages are right censored at the ceiling for the social security
contributions. Although the ceiling is quite high with annual labor earnings of
63,400 euros in 2008 for Western Germany, more than 10% of the observations are
censored. In principle, there are two ways to deal with this problem: impute the
censored wages or exclude the observations. We opt for the latter and exclude all
workers from the baseline sample which have at least once earned a wage above the
contribution ceiling during the observation period. There are two reasons for this
rigorous treatment, which particularly affects high-skilled workers.17 First, as we
will argue below, the estimated wage effect is a lower bound. Second, given that
the imputation method cannot replicate the true data generating process, imputing
parts of the wages creates an artificial variation in the left-hand side variable, which
might lead to biased conclusions. In fact, if corporate taxes do affect wages, one
must control for them in the imputation stage and would create endogeneity per
definition. We check the sensitivity of our results with respect to the treatment of
censored wages and find large differences in the results for high-skilled workers.
The firm component of the LIAB is the IAB Establishment Panel (Ko¨lling,
2000), which is a stratified random sample of all German establishments. The
term establishment refers to the fact that the observational unit is the individual
plant, not the firm; there can be several plants per firm. The employer data covers
17 We differentiate between three skill groups: high-skilled workers have obtained a col-
lege/university degree; medium-skilled have either completed a vocational training or obtained
the highest high school diploma (Abitur); low-skilled have neither completed a vocational training
nor obtained the Abitur.
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establishments with at least one worker for whom social insurance contributions
were paid. We extract the following variables: value added, investment, number of
employees, industry, total wage bill, legal form, union wage status (industry, firm or
no collective agreement), self-rated profitability18, presence of a work council.
Sample selection and descriptive statistics. We restrict our baseline sample
to full-time workers in corporate firms in the manufacturing industry liable to the
LBT. We exclude part-time and marginally employed workers to rule out adjust-
ments at different margins (notably hours of work) and solely focus on the wage
effect. As stated above, we exclude all workers that have at least once earned a
wage above the contribution ceiling during the observation period – we check the
sensitivity of the results with respect to this assumption below. As far as firm
characteristics are concerned, the choice of focusing on firms that are liable to the
LBT is obvious – yet we use non-liable firms for a placebo test below. We further
narrow the baseline sample to corporate firms since the effective statutory marginal
tax rate for non-corporate firms cannot be calculated given the information in the
LIAB. Nevertheless, we estimate the wage incidence for non-corporate firms as a
sensitivity check, making assumptions on the personal income tax rate. Last, we
focus on manufacturing firms, which are the backbone of the German economy and
make up the largest share of the corporate firm sample (66%). Again, we present
effects for other industries as an extension.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the baseline sample. The average monthly
wage in our sample is 3,171 euros (all money variables are in 2008 euros). Wages are
increasing in qualification. The average age is 41, the average firm specific tenure
11 years. Men are over-represented. The share of high-skilled workers is very low
due to the strict treatment of censored wages (the share in the whole sample is
14%). At the same time, low-skilled are over-represented compared to the full sam-
ple (20% vs. 14%). The average firm in the sample has 341 employees with an annual
value added of 38.8 million euros. Of all firms 46% (11%) have a sector (firm) level
collective bargaining agreement in place, while 29% of the plants are part of a multi-
establishment company. The average plant is located in a municipality with 27,200
inhabitants, a regional unemployment rate of 12% and collection rate of 348%.
18 The survey question asks for a self-assessment of the profit situation on a five-point scale
ranging from very good to unsatisfactory. We dichotomize the variable into good and poor prof-
itability.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics, baseline sample, LIAB 1998-2008
mean sd min max N
monthly wage 3171 813 421 5510 4016476
high-skilled wage 3736 867 441 5509 143565
medium-skilled wage 3213 820 421 5509 3062917
low-skilled wage 2913 685 466 5510 809994
age 41 10 16 64 4016476
tenure 11 8 0 34 4016476
share: male 0.81 0.39 0 1 4016476
share: blue collar 0.83 0.37 0 1 4016476
employees (fulltime) 341 1637 1 48826 14379
annual value added (in 1000) 38845 230549 9 10570000 14379
annual investments (in 1000) 4336 31867 0 1755000 14379
share: sector union contract 0.46 0.50 0 1 14379
share: firm union contract 0.11 0.31 0 1 14379
share: no union contract 0.44 0.50 0 1 14379
share: stand alone plant 0.71 0.45 0 1 14379
share: part of multi-plant firm 0.29 0.45 0 1 14379
collection rate (in %) 348 42 150 520 6753
population (in 1000) 27.19 115.49 0 3426 6753
local unemp. rate 0.12 0.06 0 0 6753
municipal revenues (in millions) 48.24 199.97 4 4416 6753
municipal expenses (in millions) 43.42 194.82 4 5971 6753
Source: LIAB and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder. Note: All money variables in 2008 euros.
5 Empirical results
In the following section, we estimate the incidence of corporate taxation on wages.
We start off by providing non-parametric evidence using an event study design
(Section 5.1). Section 5.2 presents the regression model. In Section 5.3 we analyze
the direct wage effect and address potential identification challenges. In Section
5.4 we estimate the full wage effect including the indirect effect and find that the
latter is negligible in the context of the German local business tax. Consequently,
we further explore the direct effect, testing for heterogeneous worker (Section 5.5)
and firm effects (Section 5.6).
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5.1 Event study
As a first check we provide a non-parametric test whether corporate taxes affect
wages using an event study design. We average wages at the municipal level and
look at differences in the wage growth rates between municipalities that have changed
the tax rate and municipalities that have not. We assign municipalities to treatment
and control group according to the following criteria: a municipality is treated if a
tax increase occurred at the beginning of year t and no tax changes happened in
years t − 2, t − 1, t + 1, t + 2. Conversely, a municipality is assigned to the control
group if no tax change occurred from year t− 2 to t+ 2. We thus analyze five-year
spells of nominal wage growth around a change in the LBT occurring in year t. In
the upper panel of Figure 2 all firm types are used to calculate average wages; in
the lower part only firms with collective bargaining agreements are considered.
Figure 2: Mean change in wages in %
The figure clearly shows that there is a negative effect of profit taxation on
wages, but – in line with the theory – we only find a significant effect for firms with
collective bargaining agreements (confidence intervals are bootstrapped using 200
draws). In t, i.e. the year of the tax change, the wage growth path of treated firms
with CBAs becomes flatter, while the path for the control group is not affected.
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In period t + 1 the growth path for the treated lies significantly below the one for
the control group. Note that in both panels of Figure 2 wage growth paths are
identical until period t − 1, which indicates that the common trend assumption
holds. Translating the graphical evidence to numbers, we find that the wage growth
for CBA firms from year t−1 to year t+1 in the control (treatment) group is 6.14%
(3.09%). The average increase in the EMTR in period t is 1.3%. Taking average
values for pre-tax profits and the total wage bill, this implies a wage bill incidence
of −77 cents for a 1 euro increase in the tax bill.
5.2 Empirical model
We estimate a Mincerian wage equation using the log monthly wage of individual
i in firm f , municipality m and year t, ln(wifm,t), as dependent variable. The
independent variable of interest is the collection rate of municipalitym, ln(crm,t). We
further include three sets of control variables on the worker, firm and municipality
level. Controls on the worker level are captured by vector Xi,t and include age
and firm specific tenure (both in quadratic forms). On the firm level, vector Yf,t
controls for the number of employees, value added, investment, full-time hours (all
in logs), skill shares of the workforce, and a work council dummy. Municipality
controls are denoted by Zm,t and comprise the population size, the property tax
rate, total revenues and expenses (in logs) as well as the local unemployment rate
(on the county level). In addition, we control for a large set of potential confounding
wage trends by including skill-year, occupation-year (blue/white collar), firm size-
year, collective agreement type-year as well as state-year fixed effects (all trends are
summarized in vector Tifm,t). Furthermore, we include four kinds of fixed effects:
person, firm, municipal and year (µi, µf , µm, µt). The baseline model thus reads
lnwifm,t = αt−l ln τm,t−l + βX′i,t + γY′f,t + λZ′m,t+
Tifm,t + µi + µf + µm + µt + εifm,t,
(11)
where the error term εifm,t is clustered at the county level.
The year fixed effects account for changes in the tax base and for changes in
the federal rates of the LBT and the corporate tax. By including person, firm and
municipal fixed effects, we wipe out any time-invariant confounding factor on these
levels, such as unobserved worker or management ability, or geographical location.
Technically, we apply the spell fixed-effects estimator suggested by Andrews et al.
(2006) by time-demeaning within each unique worker-firm-municipality combina-
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tion.19 We manually add the time-trend dummies included in vector Tifm,t.
While the regression equation (11) could imply that the simultaneity between
wages and tax rates biases our estimates, a closer look at the timing of events reveals
that reverse causality should not be an issue. The city council of municipality m
usually sets the collection rate for year t in the last three months of year t − 1.
In the LIAB, wages are measured as of June 30th of year t. So when regressing
wages in t on collection rates in t, there is already a lag of 7 to 9 months, which
should mitigate reverse causality concerns. Nevertheless, our estimates might suffer
from endogeneity if there are unobserved local shocks that affect both tax rates and
wages. We will address this issue below using different approaches.
5.3 Direct wage effect
Table 4 presents the baseline results for the direct wage effect. We thus regress log
wages on log collection rates conditional on the number of employees, investment
and output. In the first specification we include all firm types – with and without a
CBA in place. We find a significant and negative coefficient: an increase in the local
collection rate by 1%, leads to a decrease of the average wage in a firm by 0.076%.
As this estimate is not easy to interpret, we translate the log-log coefficient into
two more intuitive measures, a wage elasticity and an incidence measure. While the
wage elasticity measures the percent change in wages of a one percent increase of the
(statutory) EMTR, the incidence reports the euro change of the annual wage bill –
for given employment levels – as a response to a one euro increase of the annual tax
liabilities. We report the two measures at the bottom of Table 4. For specification
(1) we find a wage elasticity of -0.31 and an incidence of -44 cents. Note that results
are similar when using the collection rate in levels instead of logs (see Table B.1 in
Appendix B). In the second and third specification we estimate our model separately
for firms with and without a CBA. We only find a significant direct wage effect for
workers in firms with a CBA (elasticity of −0.38; incidence of −53 cents). This is in
line with the theoretical model, as the direct effect arises due a shock to the rents in
a wage bargaining framework. Theoretically there cannot be a direct effect in firms
without a CBA which is empirically confirmed in specification (3). We thus exclude
firms without a CBA from the sample when further investigating the direct wage
effect and refer to specification (2) as our baseline estimates.
19 Note that only a few establishments change location, so in practice the firm dummies are
collinear with the municipality dummies and the model is almost identical to a two-way fixed
effects model.
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Table 4: Direct effect on log wages: baseline results
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm type All With CBA Without CBA With CBA
log collection ratet -0.076
∗∗ -0.093∗∗ 0.024 -0.098∗∗
(0.036) (0.045) (0.031) (0.048)
log collection ratet: sector level -0.092
∗∗
(0.045)
log collection ratet: firm level -0.094
∗
(0.055)
log collection ratet−1 -0.019
(0.034)
log value added 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log investment 0.000 -0.000 0.004∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log employees 0.038∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
log full-time hours 0.031 0.033 0.013 0.033 0.035
(0.037) (0.040) (0.071) (0.040) (0.040)
work council 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.002 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
share high-skilled employees -0.000 0.002 -0.051 0.002 0.001
(0.051) (0.058) (0.045) (0.058) (0.061)
share medium-skilled employees -0.008 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.023
(0.036) (0.048) (0.020) (0.048) (0.052)
local unemp. rate -0.061 -0.026 -0.106 -0.026 0.043
(0.124) (0.145) (0.116) (0.145) (0.155)
community population 0.083 0.106∗ -0.119 0.106∗ 0.137∗∗
(0.053) (0.062) (0.088) (0.062) (0.066)
log expenses -0.010∗ -0.013∗∗ 0.008 -0.013∗∗ -0.013∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
log revenues 0.013∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.003 0.017∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
local property tax rate -0.060∗ -0.079∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.087∗∗
(0.032) (0.037) (0.025) (0.037) (0.038)
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.198 0.142 0.198 0.181
Observations 4016476 3512491 503985 3512491 3204780
Groups 1240030 1085873 210230 1085873 1014992
Clusters 405 395 351 395 395
Long run effect -0.118∗∗
Wage elasticity -0.31 -0.38 0.09 -0.46
Wage elasticity: sector level -0.39
Wage elasticity: firm level -0.35
Euro incidence -0.44 -0.53 0.12 -0.67
Euro incidence: sector level -0.49
Euro incidence: firm level -0.62
Note: All specifications include person, firm, municipal and year fixed effects as well as:
skill-year, occupation-year, firm size-year, CBA type-year, state-year fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) clustered at county level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05
(**), and 0.01 (***).
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Interacting the collection rate with dummies for sector level vs. firm level bar-
gaining reveals that there is hardly any difference when it comes to point estimates
and wage elasticities (model (4)). Despite this similarity there is quite a large dif-
ference in terms of the euro incidence between firms with the two CBA-types. As
predicted by the theoretical model, we find that the wage incidence is 27% higher
(13 cents) in firms where the bargaining takes place at the firm level compared to
firms with a sector level CBA.20
Next, we check the timing of the wage effect. As stated above, the implicit lag
of the collection rate in the baseline specification (regressing ln(wifm,t) on ln(crm,t))
is 7 to 9 months. Nevertheless, it might be the case that some firms are not able
to adjust wages that quickly given that the average duration of a collective bar-
gaining agreement in Germany is between one and two years (cf. Section 2). As a
consequence we estimate a distributed lag model adding the collection rates in t−1.
Thus, this model shows how CBA firms react to profit tax changes within 19 to
21 months. Results are shown in specification (5) of Table 4. Note that we report
the long-run effect, which is calculated by adding the two coefficients for periods t
and t − 1 and testing the joint significance at the bottom of the table; the wage
elasticity and incidence measure for specification (5) rely on this long-run effect.
Intuitively, elasticities and incidence rise in absolute terms when comparing model
(5) to model (3). Yet, the increase is rather small, which suggests that most of the
wage adjustments take place within the first 9 months. Adding the collection rate
of period t− 2 does not change results (not reported).
Identification. As mentioned before, we interpret the German institutional set-
ting as many quasi-experiments in a small open economy setting at the municipal
level. Nonetheless, our analysis might be prone to endogeneity issues. We have
argued above that reverse causality from wages to tax rates should not be an issue
because of the timing of the events. In terms of omitted variable bias, it is impossi-
ble to find an instrument varying on the municipal level which would not be affected
by the same unobserved local shock that affects both tax rates and wages.
Yet, we still have to rule out that our estimates are biased due to unobserved
time-variant confounders.21 There are two likely sources for this kind of confounding
variation. First, any shock hitting the local labor market might affect simultane-
20 The average wage in firms with a firm-level CBA is about 5% lower than in firms with a
sector-level CBA.
21 Table B.2 in Appendix B shows the importance of accounting for time-invariant confounders
as omitting person fixed effects renders the tax coefficient insignificant.
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ously the budget of municipalities and the (wage-setting) behavior of firms.22 Thus,
we add quadratic labor market region-trends to our baseline model to account for
such potentially unobserved local labor market shocks.23 Second, there might be
shocks to certain industries and occupations, which should clearly affect the wages.
As many industries (and thus occupations) are regionally clustered (Sternberg and
Litzenberger, 2004), those shocks might also affect local taxation. While our baseline
estimates already focus on the manufacturing industry, we go one step further and
include job-year fixed effects to our model.24 If industries and jobs are regionally
clustered, the inclusion of these job-year fixed effects should take care of any such
endogeneity problems.
Table 5 shows how adding quadratic labor market region-trends and job-year
fixed effects influences the baseline estimates, which are shown in specification (1).
Reassuringly, controlling for labor market region or job shocks does not change
the direct wage effect much. Estimates decreases slightly but remain significant
at the 10% level. Of course, statistical significance decreases as we take out more
variation with these specifications. We now find a direct wage elasticity of -0.33 and
an incidence of -0.46 cents. Overall, our results seem to be robust to time-varying
confounders since it is unlikely that a potential confounder is neither correlated with
labor market region nor job trends.
We provide a further identification test by running a placebo regression ex-
ploiting the fact that certain firms are not liable to the LBT. Most firms in the
public sector are not liable as well as firms in the agricultural or mining indus-
try. Moreover, there are special exemptions within the manufacturing sector and in
other industries. Specification (4) of Table 5 presents the result of a placebo test
confirming that the effect of the LBT on the wages in non-liable firms is zero.
22Yet, the direction of the bias remains unclear. To see this, think of a local shock increasing
unemployment. As a response, firms might be able to lower wages (or to increase them less).
However, it is not clear whether municipalities will lower (to attract investment) or raise (to
accommodate the higher welfare expenses) their local tax rates as a response to the shock.
23 Labor market regions delineate independent economic areas around an economic center where
the appendant areas are defined on commuter flows. In this paper, we follow the rather narrow
labor market region definition of the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and
Spatial Development (Bundesinstitut fu¨r Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung), which differentiates
between 258 regions (see Eckey et al., 2006). Note that, due to 3.5 million observations (and
remote access to the data), it is computationally not feasible to estimate the model with 258 · 11
region-year fixed effects. Hence we have to rely on a quadratic trend specification.
24 We differentiate between 33 different jobs in addition to blue and white collar occupation.
23
Table 5: Effects on log wages: exogeneity tests
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Baseline Placebo
log collection rate -0.093∗∗ -0.080∗ -0.081∗ -0.033
(0.045) (0.047) (0.043) (0.030)
log value added 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
log investment -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
log employees 0.032∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004)
log full-time hours 0.033 -0.027 0.037 0.040
(0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.044)
work council 0.006∗∗ 0.004 0.006∗∗ -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
share high-skilled employees 0.002 0.091∗ -0.015 0.041
(0.058) (0.049) (0.054) (0.041)
share medium-skilled employees -0.020 0.073∗ -0.008 0.021
(0.048) (0.039) (0.044) (0.039)
local unemp. rate -0.026 -0.185 -0.065 -0.159∗∗
(0.145) (0.151) (0.136) (0.075)
community population 0.106∗ -0.037 0.103∗ 0.114∗
(0.062) (0.088) (0.057) (0.062)
log expenses -0.013∗∗ -0.011∗ -0.012∗ 0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
log revenues 0.017∗∗ 0.010 0.016∗∗ -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
local property tax rate -0.079∗∗ -0.033 -0.072∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.025)
labor market region trends No Yes No No
job-year FE No No Yes No
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.226 0.210 0.397
Observations 3512491 3512491 3512491 287206
Groups 1085873 1085873 1085873 113810
Clusters 395 395 395 368
Elasticity -0.38 -0.33 -0.33
Incidence -0.53 -0.46 -0.46
Note: All specifications include person, firm, municipal and year fixed effects as well as:
skill-year, occupation-year, firm size-year, CBA type-year, state-year fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) clustered at county level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05
(**), and 0.01 (***).
5.4 The indirect wage effect
So far we have estimated the direct effect of corporate taxation on wages (condi-
tional on output, investment and employment), which arises due to shocks to the
overall rents in a collective bargaining context. The theoretical model in Section
3 also highlights an indirect effect of the LBT, which affects wages through lower
investment and the complementarity between labor and capital. We have argued
above that this classical Harberger-type general equilibrium effect should be small in
the German context due to the regional mobility of labor across municipal borders.
We now take a closer look at this indirect wage effect by estimating the full
wage effect of corporate taxation with the indirect effect being the difference between
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the full and the direct effect. Given that factor input responses might take some time
to unfold, we add the collection rates of period t − 1 to the model. Specification
(1) of Table 6 replicates the findings made above (specification (5) of Table 4):
the direct wage incidence for firms with a CBA is 67 cents. In the following four
specifications we estimate the full wage incidence of the LBT without conditioning
on employment, investment and/or output. The absolute incidence increases slightly
to 77 cents (specification (5)). Note that the estimate is similar to the one derived
from the event study presented in Section 5.1.
Table 6: Full tax incidence on log wages
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Firm type with CBA without CBA
log collection ratet -0.098
∗∗ -0.097∗∗ -0.098∗∗ -0.103∗∗ -0.100∗∗ 0.016 0.017 0.014 0.005 0.003
(0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.037)
log collection ratet−1 -0.019 -0.027 -0.019 -0.024 -0.035 0.038 0.038 0.043 0.004 0.005
(0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033)
log value added 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log investment -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log employees 0.033∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
log full-time hours 0.035 0.055 0.034 0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(0.040) (0.036) (0.039) (0.074) (0.073) (0.075)
work council 0.007∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
share high-skilled employees 0.001 0.012 -0.000 0.032 0.053 -0.037 -0.032 -0.035 -0.088∗ -0.086∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.065) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050)
share medium-skilled employees -0.023 -0.028 -0.023 -0.010 -0.020 -0.020 -0.016 -0.019 -0.049∗∗ -0.043∗∗
(0.052) (0.054) (0.052) (0.049) (0.053) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022)
local unemp. rate 0.043 0.024 0.041 -0.154 -0.145 -0.159
(0.155) (0.159) (0.149) (0.114) (0.116) (0.114)
community population 0.137∗∗ 0.129∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.121∗ -0.096 -0.102 -0.101 -0.101 -0.116
(0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.067) (0.069) (0.093) (0.094) (0.096) (0.107) (0.111)
log expenses -0.013∗ -0.013∗ -0.013∗ -0.012∗ -0.012∗ 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
log revenues 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
local property tax rate -0.087∗∗ -0.088∗∗ -0.087∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.066∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028)
firm-size year FE Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No
Adjusted R2 0.181 0.180 0.181 0.177 0.176 0.129 0.128 0.128 0.114 0.108
Observations 3204780 3204780 3204780 3204780 3204780 484767 484767 484767 484767 484767
Groups 1014992 1014992 1014992 1014992 1014992 202613 202613 202613 202613 202613
Clusters 395 395 395 395 395 350 350 350 350 350
Elasticity -0.46 -0.49 -0.46 -0.50 -0.53
Incidence -0.67 -0.71 -0.67 -0.72 -0.77
Note: All specifications include person, firm, municipal and year fixed effects as well as:
skill-year, occupation-year, firm size-year, CBA type-year, state-year fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) clustered at county level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05
(**), and 0.01 (***).
The higher incidence implies an indirect wage effect of roughly 10 cents. This
increase is too small to be statistically significant. Thus we cannot state that the
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direct effect is different from the full effect. In line with the theoretical model and
given the very local nature of the corporate tax, the small indirect effect may not be
surprising. Workers are mobile within labor market regions, which prevents wages
from falling when investment decreases. In fact, the companion paper by Siegloch
(2013) shows that there is indeed a negative employment effect of the LBT, which
can be attributed to local labor mobility.
Specifications (6) to (10) of Table 6 show further evidence of a negligible indi-
rect effect by looking at firms without a collective bargaining agreement. Model (6)
confirms that there is no direct effect for non-CBA firms. In specifications (7) to
(10), we estimate the full, unconditional wage incidence model and find that there
seems to be no indirect effect as the point estimate remains zero.
5.5 Heterogeneous worker effects
In this section we use the rich LIAB data to test whether different worker groups
are affected differently by corporate taxation. Given the small indirect wage effect,
we focus on the direct effect, excluding firms without a CBA and conditioning on
employment, value added and investment in the estimation.
Skill. We start by testing one specific feature of our theoretical model, namely
heterogeneous skill effects. As described in Section 4.2, we differentiate between
three skill groups (high, medium and low). In order to test for heterogeneous worker
effects, we interact the log collection rate with skill dummy variables. Specification
(1) of Table 7 shows that the wage effect of corporate taxes is driven by medium-
skilled workers. We neither find a significantly negative effect for high nor for low-
skilled wages. Yet, it is possible that there are different adjustment speeds for
different skill types. Hence, we also add interacted collection rates of period t− 1 to
the model (specification (2)). It turns out that corporate taxes also have a negative
and significant long-run effect (the sum of the two coefficients for periods t and
t − 1) on high-skilled wages. In fact, the high-skilled long-run wage elasticity is
more negative than the one for medium-skilled (-0.54 vs. -0.48). The effect on low-
skilled workers remains small and not significantly distinguishable from zero. This
suggests that the wage incidence is increasing in skill: the higher the qualification,
the stronger the negative wage effect. This pattern is in line with intuition since
it is more difficult to reduce the rents of low-skilled workers whose wage rates are
already close to the implicit minimum wage, which is determined by unemployment
benefits and social assistance. A tax increase in the bargaining model decreases the
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overall rents to be shared between the firm and its workers. Worker groups that
generally do not receive much of the rents do not have much to lose from the rent
shock: bargaining power is self-defeating as shown in Section 3. In terms of the
incidence, firms reduce the wage bill of the medium-skilled most, which is, of course,
a pure size effect, given that 75% of the workers are medium-skilled.
Table 7: Effects on log wages: by skill
Model (1) (2)
log collection ratet x high skilled -0.099 -0.081
(0.073) (0.058)
log collection ratet x medium skilled -0.097
∗∗ -0.096∗∗
(0.045) (0.046)
log collection ratet x low skilled -0.061 -0.121
(0.056) (0.075)
log collection ratet−1 x high skilled -0.062
(0.042)
log collection ratet−1 x medium skilled -0.027
(0.033)
log collection ratet−1 x low skilled 0.041
(0.059)
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.181
Observations 3512491 3204780
Groups 1085873 1014992
Clusters 395 395
Long run effect: high skilled -0.099 -0.142∗
Long run effect: medium skilled -0.097∗∗ -0.123∗∗
Long run effect: low skilled -0.061 -0.080
Wage elasticity: high skilled -0.39 -0.54
Wage elasticity: medium skilled -0.40 -0.48
Wage elasticity: low skilled -0.26 -0.33
Euro incidence: high skilled -0.12 -0.17
Euro incidence: medium skilled -0.43 -0.56
Euro incidence: low skilled -0.06 -0.08
Note: All specifications include the same control variables as the baseline (Table 4) includ-
ing person, firm, municipal and year fixed effects as well as: skill-year, occupation-year,
firm size-year, CBA type-year, state-year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses)
clustered at county level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
Wage censoring. As stated above, we make a rather rigorous choice in treating
censored wages. By dropping all workers that have once had a censored wage during
the observation period, we exclude many high-skilled workers and supposedly keep
a negatively selected group of the highly qualified. In the following we test the
sensitivity of our results with respect to this choice. While specification (1) of Table
8 shows the baseline results, we relax the rigorous treatment of censored wages
slowly when moving to the right: in model (2) we only drop the workers in years
where wages are actually censored (as opposed to dropping all workers with once
censored wages). In specification (3), we do not drop any observations but use the
contribution ceiling as the wage when observations are censored. In the last model,
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we impute censored wages using the Tobit-procedure provided by the IAB (Gartner,
2005).
Table 8: Effects on log wages: Sensitivity w.r.t wage censoring
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage treatment person never censored not censored in t ceiling imputed
log collection rate x high skilled -0.099 -0.045 0.019 -0.017
(0.073) (0.074) (0.049) (0.057)
log collection rate x medium skilled -0.097∗∗ -0.105∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.039) (0.044)
log collection rate x low skilled -0.061 -0.068 -0.072 -0.091
(0.056) (0.056) (0.049) (0.058)
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.208 0.221 0.140
Observations 3512491 3820751 4592096 4592096
Groups 1085873 1197097 1373324 1373324
Clusters 395 395 395 395
Wage elasticity: high skilled -0.39 -0.18 0.08 -0.07
Wage elasticity: medium skilled -0.40 -0.43 -0.43 -0.51
Wage elasticity: low skilled -0.26 -0.29 -0.31 -0.39
Euro incidence: high skilled -0.12 -0.06 0.02 -0.02
Euro incidence: medium skilled -0.43 -0.46 -0.46 -0.53
Euro incidence: low skilled -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09
Note: All specifications include the same control variables as the baseline (Table 4) includ-
ing person, firm, municipal and year fixed effects as well as: skill-year, occupation-year,
firm size-year, CBA type-year, state-year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses)
clustered at county level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
The results show that the treatment of censored wages affects skill groups
differently. The coefficients for the medium- and low-skilled become slightly more
negative, but expectedly do not change much as most of these workers earn wages
below the contribution ceiling. In contrast, the coefficient on the high-skilled is very
sensitive: it changes size and sign across specifications. Based on these insights,
we argue that our rigorous sample selection with respect to the wage censoring is
the only reliable way. This, however, might come at the cost that we are likely
to face a negatively selected group of high-skilled workers. If this is the case, the
true direct wage incidence for the high-skilled is probably even more negative, given
that higher ability high-skilled are likely to extract more rents than lower ability
high-skilled. Hence, our baseline estimates arguably provide a lower bound for high-
skilled workers.
Worker characteristics. Next, we test for other heterogeneous worker effects
(see Table 9) by interacting the log collection rate with various worker type dummy
variables.25 Specifications (1) and (2) show that there are neither significant differ-
ences by tenure nor by age groups. Moreover, we do not find different wage effects
25 The base effects of the dummy variables are included but not shown in the table.
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for blue and white-collar workers. Last in model (4), we differentiate between work-
ers who switch firms and workers who stay in the same plant during our period of
observation. The latter group is apparently less mobile and might therefore bear a
higher corporate tax burden. In fact, as Table 9 suggests, job stayers show a much
higher negative wage effect, whereas more mobile workers who change firms do not
seem to be affected at all by the burden shifting of firms (the point estimate for job
switchers is positive but not statistically significantly so).
Table 9: Heterogenous worker effects on log wages
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Group firm tenure age collar type mobility
log collection rate -0.091∗ -0.094∗∗ -0.089∗ -0.103∗∗
(0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
log collection rate ∗ medium -0.004
(0.016)
log collection rate ∗ high 0.007
(0.022)
log collection rate ∗ medium 0.003
(0.010)
log collection rate ∗ old 0.003
(0.019)
log collection rate ∗ white collar -0.027
(0.025)
log collection rate ∗ mobile workers 0.214∗∗∗
(0.070)
Adjusted R2 0.199 0.199 0.198 0.199
Observations 3512491 3512491 3512491 3512491
Groups 1085873 1085873 1085873 1085873
Clusters 395 395 395 395
Note: All specifications include the same control variables as the baseline (Table 4) includ-
ing person, firm, municipal and year fixed effects as well as: skill-year, occupation-year,
firm size-year, CBA type-year, state-year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses)
clustered at county level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
5.6 Heterogeneous firm effects
Finally, we use the establishment part of the LIAB to check for heterogeneous firm
effects. As done in Section 5.5, we focus on the direct wage effect for CBA firms.
We start off by testing differences between corporate and non-corporate firms (Per-
sonengesellschaften). As noted above, the tax treatment of the two legal types is
quite different. Non-corporate firms are not subject to the corporate tax but the
personal income tax (on operating profits assigned to the proprietor), which is pro-
gressive and where marginal rates consequently depend on the taxable income. As
for the LBT the definition of the base also differs compared to corporate firms.26 As
26 Non-corporate firms have an allowance of 24,500 euros. In addition, a share of the LBT
liabilities can be deducted from the personal income tax base: 1.8 · τfed · Y from 2001 to 2007
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firm characteristics also differ strongly between corporate and non-corporate firms
– notably in terms of size –, we split the sample and estimate the baseline model
separately for both legal types. Despite the stark differences, specification (1) and
(2) of Table 10 shows that point estimates and therefore wage elasticities are quite
similar between corporate and non-corporate firms. Yet, the negative wage effect for
non-corporate firms (specification (2)) is not statistically significant at conventional
levels (p-value of 0.11). The wage incidence of non-corporate firms is only 30 cents
as compared to 53 cents for corporate firms. This might be explained by lower bar-
gaining power of workers in non-corporate firms where owners are more dominant
and workers less organized.
Recall that our baseline sample is restricted to firms in the manufacturing
sector. We estimate the baseline model also for the traffic and service sectors.
Interestingly, we do not find significantly negative effects for the two other sectors
as indicated by specifications (4) and (5) of Table 10, which could also be due to
lower bargaining power of workers – especially in the service sector (where wages
are closer to the implicit minimum wage).
Next, we run several interaction models to test for further firm heterogeneity.
Table 11 shows the results. In model (1) we test whether there are differences
between single and multi-establishment firms following the theoretical analysis of the
tax incidence under formula apportionment shown in Appendix A. The interaction
term is insignificant suggesting that the wage incidence does not differ between
single and multi-establishment firms, which is not surprising given that the formula
apportionment is based on the wage bill of the respective establishment.
Looking at the effects by firm size in specification (2), we find an interesting
pattern: there are strong negative effects on wages for small firms with less than
50 employees and for larger firms with more than 250 workers. Medium-sized firms
with a workforce of 50-250 do not seem to cut wages after increases of the LBT.
Specifications (3) and (4) show that there are no differences in terms of the firm’s
profitability or between firms with and without a work council. Last, we use a
survey question of the LIAB asking “whether local taxation was important for the
initial location decision of the firm”. Intuitively, we only find significantly negative
and 3.8 · τfed · Y since 2008 onwards. Moreover, there was a reduced τfed for small non-corporate
firms prior to 2008: for every 12,000 euros exceeding the allowance of 24,500 euros, τfed was raised
by one percentage point so that the full basic federal rate of 5.0% had to be paid with a taxable
income starting from 72,500 euros. Assuming that profits of the firms are so high that companies
are in the highest PIT bracket and face the top marginal tax rate, τ topPIT , the effective marginal tax
rate for a non-corporate firms τnon−corpEMTR from 1998 to 2007, is τ
non−corp
EMTR =
τtopPIT ·(1+soli)+τfed·cr
1+τfed·1.8 .
Since 2008 the denominator of the fraction is set to 1 + τfed · 3.8.
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Table 10: Effects on log wages - by legal form and industry
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Legal type Industry
corporate non-corporate manufacturing traffic services
log collection rate -0.093∗∗ -0.102 -0.093∗∗ -0.061 -0.023
(0.045) (0.064) (0.045) (0.045) (0.066)
log value added 0.004∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ -0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
log investment -0.000 -0.003∗ -0.000 0.006∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
log employees 0.032∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.007)
log full-time hours 0.033 0.064 0.033 0.098 0.021
(0.040) (0.051) (0.040) (0.063) (0.034)
work council 0.006∗∗ 0.009 0.006∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.004
(0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.011) (0.006)
share high-skilled employees 0.002 -0.076 0.002 0.013 0.154∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.090) (0.058) (0.146) (0.042)
share medium-skilled employees -0.020 -0.056 -0.020 0.137∗ -0.011
(0.048) (0.035) (0.048) (0.070) (0.023)
local unemp. rate -0.026 0.004 -0.026 -0.418 -0.095
(0.145) (0.257) (0.145) (0.360) (0.173)
community population 0.106∗ -0.026 0.106∗ 0.041 0.184∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.092) (0.062) (0.104) (0.069)
log expenses -0.013∗∗ 0.001 -0.013∗∗ 0.004 0.021∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.022) (0.007)
log revenues 0.017∗∗ 0.009 0.017∗∗ -0.012 -0.008
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.029) (0.009)
local property tax rate -0.079∗∗ 0.008 -0.079∗∗ 0.068 -0.025
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.057) (0.029)
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.203 0.198 0.145 0.113
Observations 3512491 201603 3512491 339154 467551
Groups 1085873 92557 1085873 98385 212523
Clusters 395 316 395 167 323
Elasticity -0.38 -0.39 -0.38 -0.25 -0.09
Incidence -0.53 -0.30 -0.53 -0.44 -0.02
Note: All specifications include person, firm, municipal and year fixed effects as well as:
skill-year, occupation-year, firm size-year, CBA type-year, state-year fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) clustered at county level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05
(**), and 0.01 (***).
tax effects for firms that cared about local taxation when choosing their location
and thus already demonstrated their tax sensitivity.
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Table 11: Heterogenous firm effects on log wages
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Group establishment type firm size profitability work council tax salience
log collection rate -0.115∗∗ -0.139∗∗ -0.097∗∗ -0.080∗ -0.071
(0.056) (0.066) (0.047) (0.048) (0.072)
log collection rate ∗ stand alone 0.025
(0.030)
log collection rate ∗ 50-250 employees 0.117∗∗
(0.051)
log collection rate ∗ 250-1000 employees 0.035
(0.062)
log collection rate ∗ >1000 employees 0.027
(0.078)
log collection rate ∗ poor 0.014
(0.015)
log collection rate ∗ work council -0.013
(0.022)
log collection rate ∗ local tax relevant. -0.047
(0.089)
Adjusted R2 0.199 0.199 0.199 0.198 0.213
Observations 3495591 3512491 3512491 3512491 2551316
Groups 1080893 1085873 1085873 1085873 647658
Clusters 394 395 395 395 364
Note: All specifications include the same control variables as the baseline (Table 4) includ-
ing person, firm, municipal and year fixed effects as well as: skill-year, occupation-year,
firm size-year, CBA type-year, state-yea r fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses)
clustered at county level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
6 Conclusions
How much of the corporate tax burden is borne by workers? While this question
has been heavily discussed ever since Harberger (1962)’s seminal work, compelling
empirical evidence is scarce due to tough requirements that have to be met in order
to identify the full wage effect. In this paper, we use the institutional setting of
German corporate taxation that provides a nearly ideal laboratory to answer this
question. On average 8% of the 11, 441 German municipalities change their cor-
porate tax rates per year. We link administrative information on the universe of
the German municipalities from 1998 to 2008 to high-quality administrative linked
employer-employee data to estimate the effect of corporate taxation on individual
wages. Moreover, local corporate tax autonomy allows us to treat the German mu-
nicipalities as many small open economies and thereby gauge the full incidence of
corporate taxation on wages, including often neglected indirect effects related to the
adjustment of investment and other input factors.
We find that a 1% increase in the corporate tax rate leads to a 0.3 − 0.5%
decrease in wages. This implies that for every additional tax euro a firm has to pay,
the wage bill declines by 44−77 cents. We decompose the full incidence into a direct
effect arising from wage bargaining and an indirect effect driven by the adjustment
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of other inputs. In line with our theoretical model, we find that the direct effect
that arises in a collective bargaining context is indeed only found for firms where
wages are set by union-firm bargaining. We also find that the negative direct wage
incidence is increasing in skills. In contrast to the direct effect, we find rather small
estimates for the indirect effect. This could be due to the specific institutional
setting of the local business tax as discussed below.
Our theoretical and empirical findings have important policy implications. In
the public and political debate arguments in favor of (higher) corporate taxes are
often based on redistributive motives: allegedly rich firm owners shall contribute to
financing public goods and social safety nets by paying their fair share of taxes.27
Opponents of high corporate taxes often claim that eventually the tax burden is
(fully) shifted to labor, being immobile in an international context.
The findings presented in this paper shed new light on this debate and show
that the shifting of the corporate tax burden is more complex. Due to the separation
between a direct and an indirect effect, we are able to demonstrate two general
mechanisms, which are pivotal for the corporate tax incidence on wages. First, if
there are rents to be shared, groups with larger rents will bear a higher corporate tax
burden. Second, the indirect effect is determined by the mobility of the production
factors in relation to the jurisdictional level at which the tax is set.
With regard to the rent sharing, it is important to distinguish between two
levels at which rents can be shared. On the one hand, rents are shared between
capital and labor. In this respect, we generally find that labor bears a substantial
share of the corporate tax burden when collective bargaining agreements are in
place.28 In turn, this result suggests that if rents were predominantly extracted by
capitalists and firm owners – for instance in a nationwide competitive labor market,
corporate taxation would be less harmful for workers. On the other hand, the tax
burden falling on labor is shared within the workforce. We find that high skilled
27 See, for example, the recent debate in the United Kingdom about big multinational firms like
the online retailer Amazon or the coffee chain Starbucks that have paid small amounts of corporate
taxes despite large revenues in the past. While this specific debate rather focuses on loopholes in
the tax base through tax avoidance possibilities of multinationals, it shows that many people expect
firms to pay more taxes to contribute to the public good (see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
19967397).
28 At first sight, this may seem to be contradictory to the tax avoiding activities of many
multinational firms, which shift profits to affiliates in low tax jurisdictions. Yet, there might be an
interdependence between profit shifting to affiliates and burden shifting to workers, as suggested
by Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2012): firms with corporate bargaining agreements in high
tax-jurisdictions should, in fact, have the incentive to shift profits abroad to reduce the observable
surplus lowering rents and their seeming bargaining power.
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workers bear a larger part of the corporate tax burden. Again, if we assume that
bargaining power is increasing in skill, this result is consistent with the theoretical
prediction that those who extract the highest rents will bear the largest share of
the tax burden. From a redistributive perspective, this might be seen as a desirable
feature.
Looking at the indirect wage effect, the following implications can be drawn
from our analysis – independently from the direct wage effect. The negligible indi-
rect effects suggest that local corporate taxation might offer a possibility to prevent
firm owners from shifting large(r) shares of the tax burden to workers. If labor
is regionally mobile, competitive wages are determined within the regional or even
the national labor market and should hardly respond to the tax changes in a small
jurisdiction – in line with the zero result for firms without CBAs.29 Hence, this ar-
gument is very similar to the one presented in studies on the incidence of nationwide
corporate taxes on mobile capital in an international setting.
The latter argument immediately raises the question on the generalizability of
our findings investigating local corporate taxes in a very specific institutional setting.
First, there is no reason to expect the direct wage effect to be different when looking
at national corporate taxes, as the rationale of self-defeating bargaining power in a
rent sharing setting is very general (Arulampalam et al., 2012). Second, the finding
of negligible general equilibrium wage effects – which is in contrast to previous
findings – demonstrates the central role of the underlying mobility of production
factors. On the one hand, it is likely that the indirect wage effect is higher when
analyzing the incidence of a nationwide corporate tax on wages given lower cross-
country labor mobility. On the other hand, there are presumably large differences
between small open economies exhibiting some labor mobility and large economies
like the U.S. where mobility to move abroad should be quite low. This suggests that
the indirect wage effect always depends on the specific jurisdictions and tax setting
regimes under study. The identification of a universal estimate of the average general
equilibrium wage effect in an international setting is likely to be an unachievable
challenge – at least when using real world data. In order to answer this general
question, CGE models seem to be the only option. It would be worthwhile to
replicate our empirical findings in such a model with local corporate tax autonomy
and in a second step to extrapolate the effects to the national level.
29 Labor as whole can still lose despite the negligible indirect effect on local wages as repelled
labor leads to many small but in sum substantial decreases in the marginal products (and thus in
wages) in the labor absorbing low-tax municipalities (Bradford, 1978).
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A Appendix A (For Online Publication)
In this appendix we briefly discuss some additional aspects of the corporate tax
incidence on wages implied by the wage bargaining model developed in Section 3.
Indirect effect First, consider the impact of changes in the corporate tax rate on
demand for inputs. Standard comparative analysis of equations (2) and (4) shows
that the impact of corporate tax changes on demand for labor of skill type k 6= j is
∂Lki (Ri, w
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2
i )
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where ∆ < 0 is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of the production function.
The concavity of the production function implies ∆ < 0. As stated in the text,
the equation shows that a sufficient condition for
∂Lki (Ri,w
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∂Ri
< 0 is that both skill
types are complements for each other and for capital in the production function
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> 0. But in general the sign of
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i )
∂Ri
may be positive or negative.
Sector level bargaining Next we provide the proof of result 3, which states that
the magnitude of the effect of a tax change in jurisdiction i on the wage is larger
under firm level bargaining than under sector level bargaining. Differentiating the
wage equation (9) with respect to τi and using equation (10) yields
dwks∗
dτi
|dLkh=dLjh=dKh=0=
Lkh
m∑
i=1
[Lki (1− τi)]
(
wks∗ +
Ψ
(1− βkβj)
)
,
where
Ψ = −wk(1− βk)Lkh + wj(1− βj)βkLjh − (1− βj)βk[Fi(Kh, L1h, L2h)− αrKh].
In the case of firm level bargaining (m = 1), the direct effect can be expressed as
dwk∗
dτi
|dLkh=dLjh=dKh=0=
1
(1− τh)
(
wks∗ +
Ψ
(1− βkβj)
)
,
which is unambiguously larger since
Lkh
m∑
i=1
[Lki (1− τi)]
<
1
(1− τh) .
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Formula apportionment Finally, we discuss the implications of formula appor-
tionment for our theoretical analysis. If firms have plants in more than one mu-
nicipality, the LBT in Germany uses formula apportionment to allocate the taxing
rights to the different municipalities. The formula used in Germany is based on
payroll as the only apportionment factor.30 Given this, the impact of tax changes
on wages may be different. Consider a company with plants in two jurisdictions i
and j. After tax profits of the company are
P FA = [F (Ki, Kj,L
1
i , L
2
i , L
1
j , L
2
j)−
2∑
k=1
wkLki −
2∑
k=1
wkLkj ](1−τij)−(1−ατij)r[Ki+Kj]
with obvious notation. We assume that wage bargaining takes place at the firm
level, not at the plant level, and that wages paid to workers of a given skill group
are the same in the two plants. The profit tax rate is now given by
τij = T + (1− T )
θi
2∑
k=1
wkLki + θj
2∑
k=1
wkLkj
2∑
k=1
wkLki +
2∑
k=1
wkLkj
The main difference to the case where firms just operate in one jurisdiction is that
the profit tax rate itself now depends on wages and the distribution of employment
at the two plants, i.e. τij = τij(w
1, w2, L11...), with
∂τij
∂wl
= [θi − θj]
[
Lli
Lmi
− L
l
j
Lmj
]
Lmi L
m
j
(1− T )
γ
l = 1, 2, l 6= m,
where
γ =
[
1 +
wlLli + w
mLmi
wlLlj + w
mLmj
]2
[wlLlj + w
mLmj ]
2 > 0.
Assume, for instance, that municipality i has a higher tax rate than municipality j,
and assume that the wage of the low-skilled increases. In this case the impact on
the tax burden will depend on whether this increases the payroll share of the high or
that of the low tax municipality. If the share of low-skilled is higher in jurisdiction i
so that
[
Lli
Lmi
− Llj
Lmj
]
> 0, the tax rate τij will increase, and vice versa. Therefore the
effect of a wage change on the tax rate is ambiguous for the general case.
The fact that the firm’s profit tax rate is now a function of the wage rates also
implies that the direct effect of a change in the local corporate tax rate t on wages
as defined in the preceding sections is now ambiguous. The Nash maximand of the
30 In cases where this leads to an outcome which is obviously inappropriate, the tax rate can be
divided differently. But in most cases the payroll based formula is applied.
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union-form bargaining problem is now given by
ΩkFAi = β
k lnZki + (1− βk) lnP FA
The equilibrium wage rates are
wkFA∗ = wk +
βk
(1− βk)
P FA
[(Lki + L
k
j )(1− τij)− Φ]
k = 1, 2, (12)
where
Φ =
∂P FA
∂τij
∂τij
∂wk
.
Equation (12) implicitly defines the two wage rates emerging from the bargaining
process as reaction functions of the type wlFA∗ = wlFA∗(wmFA∗, θi, θj, T...). Differ-
entiating equation (12) shows that the direct effect of a change in the local corporate
tax rates on the equilibrium wage rates is, in general, ambiguous.31 This suggests
that the incidence of the local corporate tax on wages in firms with plants in multiple
jurisdictions could differ systematically from the incidence in firms which operate
in one jurisdiction only, but the sign of the effects is ambiguous. In the empirical
analysis, the role of formula apportionment is investigated by distinguishing between
single and multi-establishment firms.
31 Unambiguous results only emerge if there is only one skill group. In this case, it is straightfor-
ward to show that the effects of a profit tax change in one jurisdiction on wages in that jurisdiction
is smaller than it would be in a single plant firm.
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Table B.1: Robustness: effects on wages in levels
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
log collection ratet -0.093
∗∗ -0.098∗∗
(0.045) (0.048)
log collection ratet−1 -0.019
(0.034)
collection rate -0.028∗∗ -0.031∗∗
(0.013) (0.014)
collection ratet−1 -0.004
(0.010)
log value added 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log investment -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log employees 0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
log full-time hours 0.033 0.035 0.033 0.035
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
work council 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
share high-skilled employees 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.058) (0.061) (0.058) (0.060)
share medium-skilled employees -0.020 -0.023 -0.019 -0.023
(0.048) (0.052) (0.048) (0.051)
local unemp. rate -0.026 0.043 -0.028 0.042
(0.145) (0.155) (0.145) (0.154)
community population 0.106∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.104∗ 0.134∗∗
(0.062) (0.066) (0.062) (0.066)
log expenses -0.013∗∗ -0.013∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.013∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
log revenues 0.017∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
local property tax rate -0.079∗∗ -0.087∗∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.083∗∗
(0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037)
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.181 0.198 0.181
Observations 3512491 3204780 3512491 3204780
Groups 1085873 1014992 1085873 1014992
Clusters 395 395 395 395
Elasticity -0.38 -0.46 -0.46 -0.54
Incidence -0.53 -0.67 -0.64 -0.79
Note: All specifications include person, firm, municipal and yea r fixed effects as well as:
skill-year, occupation-year, firm size-year, CBA type-year, state-year fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) clustered at county level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05
(**), and 0.01 (***).
41
Table B.2: Robustness: Effects on log wages - different fixed effects
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Effects Baseline Only Worker Only Firm Only Municipal
log collection rate -0.098∗∗ -0.098∗∗ -0.059 -0.009
(0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.068)
log value added 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
log investment -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
log employees 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
log full-time hours 0.036 0.036 0.015 -0.264∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.046) (0.072)
work council 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.002 0.096∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.013)
share high-skilled employees -0.000 -0.000 0.030 0.099∗∗
(0.058) (0.058) (0.054) (0.047)
share medium-skilled employees -0.022 -0.022 -0.032 0.087∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.041) (0.039)
local unemp. rate -0.023 -0.023 -0.059 -0.301
(0.148) (0.148) (0.140) (0.184)
community population 0.103∗ 0.103∗ 0.100 0.006
(0.062) (0.062) (0.064) (0.090)
log expenses -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
log revenues 0.016∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
local property tax rate -0.081∗∗ -0.081∗∗ -0.049 -0.070
(0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.047)
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.200 0.214 0.238
Observations 3305718 3305718 3305718 3305718
Groups 984019 984019 2919 1412
Clusters 395 395 395 395
Elasticity -0.40 -0.40 -0.24 -0.04
Incidence -0.56 -0.56 -0.33 -0.05
Note: Dependent variable: log monthly wage. All specifications include year fixed effects
as well as year-industry fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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